From owner-chemistry@ccl.net Sat Sep 2 20:07:00 2006 From: "Sengen Sun sengensun]|[yahoo.com" To: CCL Subject: CCL: A global convention or an international joke? Message-Id: <-32467-060902175916-30275-mpQ/JbN93R05gk+a3BGWbw[]server.ccl.net> X-Original-From: Sengen Sun Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2006 13:59:10 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sent to CCL by: Sengen Sun [sengensun~~yahoo.com] Professor Boyles clearly recognizes a mis-use of the word "cause,".... "they can be exceptionally confusing to students on the linguistic level alone." . But he explained in several different ways in PHILCHEM_L why such a "mis-use" is justified in text books and in literature. . >> "good scientists are aware of these things"... >>"Empirical scientists work with many >>presuppositions and take many things >>for granted to simply 'get the job done,'". . Then, why are we a group of people who claim to be emerging philosophers of chemistry? What emerging for? Just follow experimentalists, "get the job done", make money, pound on the decades-long confusions, and make the confusions more and more solid? Are we willing to think "how philosophy is practised" uniquely? Further, it is a screaming sound to me that Shahbazian and Zahedi called for a "global convention"(!!!!!) in their conclusion of a 15 text page article in FOCH, although I absolutely have no idea what they want specifically. I guess, during a possible "global convention," some one is going to say something like: "we got to enjoy the beauty of mistakes (or mis-uses) created by our older generations. Please do not say that "the sp3 hybridization of the carbon atom in methane DOES NOT cause its tetrahedral geometry", as it is not language-economic by adding two more words "DOES NOT". A single word "cause" is much more convenient as the meaning of "cause" has never been vigorously defined and as there is no causal relation here.... " Please enjoy the "clear chemical language", a new emerging philosophy, and finally a funny international joke, my friends! Sengen > From: "Boyles, David A." > Subject: Re: PHILCHEM Digest - 28 Aug 2006 to 31 Aug > 2006 (#2006-30) > > Sengen: > > In the statement "The sp3 hybridization of the > carbon atom in methane causes its tetrahedral > geometry" as cited, we find a mis-use of the word > "cause," and a prevalent one, at that, in textbooks, > not to mention for example which of Aristotle's four > causes are being invoked--if any. Not presuming to > know with precision what Shahbazian and Zahedi > think, it is clear nonetheless that they are saying > that in a circular way we have two propositions--a > statement on hybridization, and a quite separate one > on geometry--which are referentially linked so as to > provide explanatory power. These two statements > have become linked, even though historically their > origins are very separated in time. What is > particularly interesting, perhaps, is that the most > recent proposition--hybridization theory--is used as > an explanatory cause of an earlier proposition, the > geometry of carbon (albeit with the caveat carbon in > some compounds only, and not all, although the > textbook statement does not sa! > y as much). Why this is the case and not the other > way around warrants its own scrutiny, but in any > case the impression is thus given of the > supervenience of earlier ideas which are apparently > obvious (geometrical objects) on later ideas which > are not at all overtly obvious (orbital theory), as > though the latter were the "cause" or perhaps more > correctly (?) the explanation of (?) or reason for > (?) the former. I believe good scientists are > aware of these things, while others are unaware of > them, or at least unaware of the philosophical > issues engendered by them, including their > ontological and epistemological implications to our > understanding of phenomena themselves. > > These kinds of statements are typically found in > 'textbooks' which conflate separate ideas. > Evidently this has several purposes, including > economy of verbiage on one hand, and reinforcement > of related concepts in student minds on the other. > Far from intellectually rigorous, such level books > attempt with economy to present language statements > first and foremost as tools, as code-words which > students will hopefully realize are only that as > their academic careers develop. > > Apart from the scientifically utilitarian purpose > such statements might have on the 'textbook' level, > they can be exceptionally confusing to students on > the linguistic level alone. I recall very vividly > how my undergraduate years foundered on puzzlement > not so much on the fact that there are many ideas > (propositions)in chemical space, but on the very > words used to relate one to another. Words such as > 'cause' which were never defined, but put into the > background 'created' much consternation to my own > learning experience. > > Far from trying to do the impossible and purge or > rework the language of textbooks, however, one would > do better to realize that textbooks are only > textbooks, and that for all the philosophical > problems present, that such problems are inherent in > any explanation, in any proposition, in any language > as philosophy is preeminently appreciated in making > us aware. Empirical scientists work with many > presuppositions and take many things for granted to > simply 'get the job done,' (including atomic theory > in my case--I weigh out compounds for my chemical > reactions in slavish subordination to the "count" > model of John Dalton whether or not it corresponds > to atoms makes little difference--a pianist must > likewise perform on something and in that case it > can by definition be but a keyboard of a piano) > presuppositions that require and deserve analysis in > philosophy. One begins to realize that after formal > education, perhaps, and not during it. Formal > education is a slice of reality, a pl! > atform of understanding, but not das Ding itself. > > Best Wishes, > > David A. Boyles > Professor of Chemistry > Department of Chemistry > South Dakota School of Mines and Technology > Rapid City, SD 57701 > > From: Ivan Antonowitz > Subject: Re: Comments on A Critique of Chemical > Language > > David A. Boyles posted: > >> > [snip] > Not presuming to know with precision what > Shahbazian and Zahedi think, it > is clear nonetheless that they are saying that in a > circular way we have two > propositions--a statement on hybridization, and a > quite separate one on > geometry--which are referentially linked so as to > provide explanatory power. > These two statements have become linked, even though > historically their > origins are very separated in time. > [snip] > << > > The keystone phrase in the above sentences is > "referentially linked". In the > Ordinary Language of Chemists, Philosophy and > Psychology are so > "referentially linked" as to be indistinguishable > from each other [thus > turning David's concept inside-out]. > > Many are taken aback to find that few people Read > what the author Wrote. > Even if people agree on the same Denotations, their > Connotations can diverge > into incomprehensibility. On the other hand, unless > one is a post-modernist, > we conventionally agree that the word "Unicorn" > connotes a magical > horse-like creature with no Denotation; Unicorns do > not exist. > > The catch is that Connotations and Denotations are > only pre-1920 > psychological concepts unique to human beings, and > as such are subject to > Formal Symbolic logic scrutiny to unravel their > muddled usages. In Formal > Symbolic logic we now instead distinguish Statements > from Propositions, > post-1980. Some systems still confuse the two as a > pedagogical short-cut > which is only unraveled much later on in the course. > > A further example of Dualism at work. In the > classroom, Teaching and > Learning are designed to be "referentially linked". > However, many on this > list would find it insulting to be 'taught a > lesson', but certainly expect > to learn from the other participants ideas. This > capability of 'unlinking' > is essential in any analysis. > > David could as well have used the historical > examples of electricity and > magnetism whose 'hidden unity' [J.C. Taylor] > involved just how information > was transmitted between them, despite their rather > divergent physical > characteristics. If David tried to espouse the > 'magnetic' approach, I have > tried to show the equivalent 'electric' shock. > > Ivan Anotonowitz > __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com